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(1995) Synthese 103 (1).
Does Kant's metaphysical foundations of natural science fill a gap in the critique of pure reason ?
Kenneth R. Westphal
pp. 43-86
In 1792 and 1798 Kant noticed two basic problems with hisMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN) which opened a crucial gap in the Critical system as a whole. Why is theMAdN so important? I show that the Analogies of Experience form an integrated proof of transeunt causality. This is central to Kant's ‘answer’ to Hume. This proof requires explicating the empirical concept of matter as “the moveable in space”, it requires the specifically metaphysical principle that every physical event has an external cause, and it requires a metaphysical principle regarding the individuation of spatio-temporal things. These three doctrines are not defended in the firstCritique, but only in theMAdN. Kant's transcendental analysis of the conditions of experience thus requires the “special metaphysics” of theMAdN. This marks an important shift in Kant's view of the metaphysical basis of the transcendental philosophy.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/BF01063718
Full citation:
Westphal, K. R. (1995). Does Kant's metaphysical foundations of natural science fill a gap in the critique of pure reason ?. Synthese 103 (1), pp. 43-86.
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