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(2007) Synthese 158 (2).
We investigate under what conditions a given set of collective judgments can arise from a specific voting procedure. In order to answer this question, we introduce a language similar to modal logic for reasoning about judgment aggregation procedures. In this language, the formula (square varphi) expresses that(varphi) is collectively accepted, or that(varphi) is a group judgment based on voting. Different judgment aggregation procedures may be underlying the group decision making. Here we investigate majority voting, where(square varphi) holds if a majority of individuals accepts(varphi), consensus voting, where(square varphi) holds if all individuals accept(varphi), and dictatorship. We provide complete axiomatizations for judgment sets arising from all three aggregation procedures.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9079-z
Full citation:
Pauly, M. (2007). Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language. Synthese 158 (2), pp. 233-250.
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