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(2009) Synthese 168 (1).
It is often assumed that indeterminacy in mereological relations—in particular, indeterminacy in which collections of objects have fusions—leads immediately to indeterminacy in what objects there are in the world. This assumption is generally taken as a reason for rejecting mereological vagueness. The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. I hope to show that the connection between the two forms of vagueness is not nearly so clear-cut as has been supposed.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9312-z
Full citation:
Donnelly, M. (2009). Mereological vagueness and existential vagueness. Synthese 168 (1), pp. 53-79.
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