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(2018) Synthese 195 (11).

Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology

Pierre Saint-Germier

pp. 4785-4816

In various arguments, Descartes relies on the principles that conceivability implies possibility and that inconceivability implies impossibility. Those principles are in tension with another Cartesian view about the source of modality, i.e. the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths. In this paper, I develop a ‘two-modality’ interpretation of the doctrine of eternal truths which resolves the tension and I discuss how the resulting modal epistemology can still be relevant for the contemporary discussion.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1194-x

Full citation:

Saint-Germier, P. (2018). Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology. Synthese 195 (11), pp. 4785-4816.

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