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(2001) Pluralism and law, Dordrecht, Springer.
This paper argues for the possibility of a dedicated legal logic, first by attacking the argument against it based on the presupposition that the law provides the content, not the form of arguments. The main criticism against this argument is that it presuposes that the notion of logical form is given independent of what a logic recognizes as logical form. The positive argument for the possibility of legal logic is based on a holistic view of logic, according to which there is no sharp demarcation between logic and domain theory. The paper goes on to discuss two typical topics for legal logic, that is the logical difference between rules and principles, and the evaluation of regulations in the light of the goals to which they contribute. The paper closes with an argument for the practical relevance of legal logic. In this connection it discusses the possibility to make exceptions to rules as an alternative for farfetched interpretations, and the possibility to review rules against legal principles.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2702-0_18
Full citation:
Hage, J. (2001)., Legal logic its existence, nature and use, in A. Soeteman (ed.), Pluralism and law, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 347-373.
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