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This chapter examines two classic responses to the epistemic regress problem: foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists seek to avoid the regress by invoking the non-inferential justification of basic beliefs, while coherentists do so by introducing a non-linear conception of justification. While both of these positions focus on the possibility of justifying beliefs, neither of them can establish the trustworthiness of basic epistemic methods without relying on the outcomes of those same methods. On a strictly internalist view, this means that neither of them can successfully answer the Agrippan argument that motivates Pyrrhonian scepticism and epistemic relativism. Furthermore, they both posit subjective, variable sources of justification—acquaintance and coherence—which reinforces the case for epistemic relativism.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_4

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