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Incommensurability naturalized

Alexander Bird

pp. 21-39

In this paper I argue that we can understand incommensurability in a naturalistic, psychological manner. Cognitive habits can be acquired and so differ between individuals. Drawing on psychological work concerning analogical thinking and thinking with schemata, I argue that incommensurability arises between individuals with different cognitive habits and between groups with different shared cognitive habits.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-6279-7_2

Full citation:

Bird, A. (2008)., Incommensurability naturalized, in L. Soler, H. Sankey & P. Hoyningen-Huene (eds.), Rethinking scientific change and theory comparison, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 21-39.

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