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(1980) Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions, Dordrecht, Springer.
In the preceding chapter I approached propositions by way of philosophical psychology, defining propositions as the objects of belief. But a thorough analysis led us to lend credit to the view that "the subject x believes the proposition p" can be analyzed as "x is ready to assent to the sentence s which means that p" or "x entertains a belief-content b which class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">represents p".
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_8
Full citation:
Gochet, P. (1980). Propositions as meanings of sentences, in Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 101-123.
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