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(1972) Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress, Dordrecht, Springer.
In a letter of January 1795 Schelling wrote Hegel: "Philosophy is not at an end yet. Kant has given the results, the premises are still missing. And who can understand results without premises?"1 The opinion that Kant had not completed philosophy but rather that he had first given the possibility of an adequate philosophical, that is scientific, mode of question with regard to the principles of human knowledge and action had not originally been introduced by Schelling. Even the early and most serious interpreter of Kant, such as the early Maimon, Fichte and others, found themselves compelled to statements such as Schelling's, if for a variety of motivations. Above all Reinhold, who was praised by Kant himself as a capable interpreter of his philosophy,2 was motivated in own systematic design in 1789 by the necessity of furnishing the premises for the Kantian theory of the faculties of knowledge.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_29
Full citation:
Horstmann, R.-P. (1972)., Maimon's criticism of Reinhold's "Satz des Bewusstseins", in L. White Beck (ed.), Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 330-338.
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