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(2012) Epistemology versus ontology, Dordrecht, Springer.
On 30 July 1947 Wittgenstein penned a series of remarks that have become well-known to those interested in his writings on mathematics. It begins with the remark "Turings "machines": these machines are humans who calculate. And one might express what he says also in the form of games". Though most of the extant literature interprets the remark as a criticism of Turing"s philosophy of mind (that is, a criticism of forms of computationalist or functionalist behaviorism, reductionism and/or mechanism often associated with Turing), its content applies directly to the foundations of mathematics. For immediately after mentioning Turing, Wittgenstein frames what he calls a "variant" of Cantor"s diagonal proof. We present and assess Wittgenstein"s variant, contending that it forms a distinctive form of proof, and an elaboration rather than a rejection of Turing or Cantor.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-4435-6_2
Full citation:
Floyd, J. (2012)., Wittgenstein's diagonal argument: a variation on Cantor and Turing, in P. Dybjer, S. Lindström, E. Palmgren & G. Sundholm (eds.), Epistemology versus ontology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 25-44.
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