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Methodological individualism, like many other social and philosophical concepts, is not univocally defined. According to one widespread interpretation, it is a form of atomism that is unable to account for the real nature of social life and the structural constraints that influence action. This interpretation of methodological individualism is rejected because it is incorrect both conceptually and historically. There is no equivalence between methodological individualism and atomism: the latter is a simplistic variant of the former. Two different approaches can be distinguished within the tradition of methodological individualism: one is atomistic, and the other non-atomistic. The atomistic approach, which neglects many socio-cultural constraints that influence the individual, deals with fictional situations and unrealistic hypotheses about human agency (standard economic models provide good examples of this kind of individualism). By contrast, the non-atomistic approach – which is supported by Hayek – is centered on the real historical and socio-cultural characteristics of humans and social interactions, and takes full account of the effects of social conditioning on agency (see Boettke 2012, p. 147). Since the aim of this book is to clarify the real sociological presuppositions of social life, as well as the meaning of Hayek's philosophy of action, it focuses exclusively on the non-atomistic variant of methodological individualism. While it may seem somewhat paradoxical, the idea that the individual is hermeneutically autonomous (an idea central to Hayek) it is strictly related to the recognition of the importance of social conditioning. The hermeneutical theory of action is incompatible with atomism because the former, in contrast to the latter, considers agency to be historical, socio-culturally situated, and related to intersubjectivity.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-19512-4_4

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