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(1969) Studies in Hegel, Dordrecht, Springer.

Time in Hegel's phenomenology

Alan B. Brinkley

pp. 3-15

Although it is generally acknowledged that the overriding purpose of Hegel's system is the rationalization of history, it is also generally acknowledged that Hegel failed to recognize the importance of time. That this view of Hegel could be entertained by any reader of the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, or the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, is incredible, because two works more deeply saturated with a consciousness of time could hardly be found. That such a view of Hegel retains currency in the English speaking world is perhaps explained by the fact that there is a deeply ingrained habit of reading Hegel through the eyes of the English Hegelians.1 For too long have we been told to read Bradley or McTaggart if we would know Hegel's theory of time, but since Hegel was not a Socrates who died leaving no writings, it should not be impertinent to re-examine the writings which he left in pursuit of an understanding of his theory of time. Although he wrote of time in various other works, Hegel offered his most daring and original treatment of time in The Phenomenology of Mind. His treatment there is difficult, obsure, and, in explicit treatment, briefer than one might wish, but it is adequate to show that Hegel recognized the importance of time, and further, introduced a new type of theory of time to the Western philosophical tradition.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3371-8_1

Full citation:

Brinkley, A. B. (1969). Time in Hegel's phenomenology, in Studies in Hegel, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 3-15.

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