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In the preceding discussion of phenomenology, as in those of other contemporary philosophic movements, the main concern has been accorded to descriptive and thematic analysis of related positions within a wider theoretical framework. In turning now to evaluation, it seems unnecessary to review in detail what we have examined above. It can merely be noted that in the concrete consideration of such basic phenomenological themes as crisis, social world, method, and ontology, there was in each case a shift - in post- Husserlian positions and perhaps even in that of Husserl as well — from the original Husserlian concern to protect philosophy from any contamination by subjectivity to subjectivity as a central problem. Indeed, this shift in emphasis will be an important clue in the evaluation of the phenomenological enterprise. It should be immediately noted that, although still concerned with Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology, this chapter will differ from what has previously been said in two ways. In the first place, the earlier stress on concrete description - necessary in order to set out the main lines of a position or series of positions — will be replaced here by a more abstract discussion of the philosophical adequacy of the phenomenological approach to philosophy. Second, as the post-Husserlian form of phenomenology is largely, although not solely, the result of a series of reactions to Husserl's own position, major emphasis will be laid upon Husserl's views.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8495-0_20

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