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(2004) Induction and deduction in the sciences, Dordrecht, Springer.
A little over one hundred years ago (the letter is dated July 28, 1902), Frege wrote to Russell in the following terms1: I myself was long reluctant to recognize ranges of values and hence classes; but I saw no other possibility of placing arithmetic on a logical foundation. But the question is how do we apprehend logical objects? And I have found no other answer to it than this, We apprehend them as extensions of concepts, or more generally, as ranges of values of functions. I have always been aware that there are difficulties connected with this, and your discovery of the contradiction has added to them; but what other way is there?
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-2196-1_11
Full citation:
Clark, P. (2004)., Frege, neo-logicism and applied mathematics, in F. Stadler (ed.), Induction and deduction in the sciences, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 169-183.
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