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(1970) Phenomenology and ontology, Dordrecht, Springer.
In this paper I shall critically discuss G. E. Moore's Defence of Common Sense with the purpose of showing that Moore's idea of defending common sense was entirely mistaken. This mistake is based, as I shall try to show, firstly on a mistaken notion about the nature of common sense and, secondly, on a mistaken notion about the relation between common sense beliefs and philosophy. Nothing that I say in this paper regarding the value and the validity of Moore's Defence of Common Sense should be taken as reflecting my opinion about the other aspects of Moore's philosophy.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3252-0_16
Full citation:
Mohanty, J.N. (1970). On G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, in Phenomenology and ontology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 170-179.
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