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(1973) Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, Den Haag, Nijhoff.

An interpretation of the doctrine of the ego in Husserl's ideen

Lester Embree

pp. 24-32

Husserl's Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913)1 contains relatively few statements about the Ego. However, if these statements are taken together and considered within the context of the whole work, the outlines of a fairly large and coherent doctrine appear. In the present interpretation I refer to the Ideen by sections. For the sake of verbal distinctness I adopt Dorion Cairns's translation practices of expressing the concept Husserl usually expressed with the German word Ich with the English word Ego (spelled with a capital) and of referring to the Ego pronominally in the masculine gender. Husserl usually refers to the Ego in the third person singular, a mode of expression I shall use here exclusively. I shall not use the adjectives "pure," "transcendental," "empirical," etc. because they have occasioned much misunderstanding and because what Husserl basically means by Ego can be grasped without them.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2377-1_3

Full citation:

Embree, L. (1973). An interpretation of the doctrine of the ego in Husserl's ideen, in Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 24-32.

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