Heidegger's concept of truth reconsidered in light of Tugendhat's critique

Gracie Holliday Beck

pp. 91-108

Ernst Tugendhat’s critique of Martin Heidegger’s conception of truth is an ongoing topic in Heideggerian scholarship. In this paper, I contribute to the ongoing exchange between defenders of Heidegger and those who are in agreement with Tugendhat. Specifically, I contend that Tugendhat’s criticisms fail to situate Heidegger’s account of truth within his broader phenomenological–hermeneutic project. In the end, Tugendhat’s critique is grounded upon philosophical assumptions that Heidegger is bringing under question by rethinking the concept of truth. I suggest that thinking through Tugendhat’s critique and attempting to formulate an adequate Heideggerian response gives us a richer understanding of both Heidegger’s account of truth and his general philosophical project.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2017.1403750

Full citation:

Beck, (2018). Heidegger's concept of truth reconsidered in light of Tugendhat's critique. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 49 (2), pp. 91-108.

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