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(2009) Synthese 171 (3).
In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection to the claim that memory-judgments exhibit IEM.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9318-6
Full citation:
Hamilton, A. (2009). Memory and self-consciousness: immunity to error through misidentification. Synthese 171 (3), pp. 409-417.
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