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(1978) Mental health: philosophical perspectives, Dordrecht, Springer.
Dr. Szasz tells us that he will argue that the concept of mental illness causes continuing difficulties because it is a prescriptive concept being used as though it were a descriptive concept, a justificatory concept disguised as an explanatory concept. If his arguments were correct, then he would certainly have spotted a fundamental difficulty with the current use of that concept. I do not know whether or not Dr. Szasz's claim is ultimately correct; all that I shall try to show in my remarks is that Dr. Szasz's arguments for this claim fail.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-6909-5_18
Full citation:
Brody, B. (1978)., Szasz on mental illness, in T. Engelhardt & S. Spicker (eds.), Mental health: philosophical perspectives, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 251-257.
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