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(2018) Ethics without self, Dharma without atman, Dordrecht, Springer.
The second-century Pyrrhonian sceptic, Sextus Empiricus, says that piety of a certain kind is compatible with the Pyrrhonian – i.e. radically skeptical – way of life. The contemporaneous founder of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, Nāgārjuna, also embodies a form of sceptical practice in pursuit of the spiritual goal of non-attachment, including non-attachment in intellectual matters. After some preliminary remarks on the relevance of this chapter to ethics and anatta (non-self), I give an overview of the issue of how skepticism can relate to religious practice in the texts of Sextus and Nāgārjuna. Then I show how Sextus and Nāgārjuna represent a kind of religiosity without belief that is in contrast both to conventional views about the relation between belief and religious practice as well as some contemporary views in philosophy of religion concerning belief and faith. After considering some objections to my claim that Sextus and Nāgārjuna represent a distinct category of religiosity, I end with reflections on what the study of Sextus and Nāgārjuna could add to contemporary philosophy of religion.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67407-0_4
Full citation:
Mills, E. (2018)., Skepticism and religious practice in Sextus and Nāgārjuna, in G. F. Davis (ed.), Ethics without self, Dharma without atman, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 91-106.
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