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(1995) To know or not to know, Dordrecht, Springer.
Up to now we have established that there must be a certain form of relations between the possible knower, the possible subject-matter and a set of requirements making all this possible. The form constraint does very roughly mean that the relation between the knower and the known must have the structure of a subject-object relation. In that structure the I-perspective represents the logic of the subject-position, and the object (of thought) the logic of the subject-matter position. Neither has any non formal impact, being but a set of requirements for a possible cognitive situation. We need to break out of this, and to do that we need to establish the subject as an individual who adopts the I-perspective, and the object as something that could be known, for that something cannot be just the position in which it must find itself in a cognitive situation, nor can the knower be the complimentary position.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3542-1_6
Full citation:
Srzednicki, J. (1995). Pre-conditions of knowledge 3, in To know or not to know, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 105-138.
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