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Other things equal, the chances improve

Paul M. Pietroski

pp. 259-273

The world, or rather that part of it with which we are acquainted, exhibits as we must all agree a good deal of regularity of succession. I contend that over and above that it exhibits no feature called causal necessity, but that we make sentences called causal laws… and [we] say that a fact asserted in a proposition which is an instance of causal law is a case of causal necessity (p. 160).

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1575-6_15

Full citation:

Pietroski, P. M. (1995)., Other things equal, the chances improve, in M. Marion & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Québec studies in the philosophy of science, part I, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 259-273.

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