Very often, affective sharing is regarded as a special feature of a more general form of collective intentionality which is already in place. For instance, it has been argued in the literature that sharing feeling is based on sharing a concern. In contrast to this view, I wish to address the question to what extent affective sharing may also embody a primitive form of we-consciousness of its own.
You can hear more about this issue in a few weeks’ time at Collective Intentionality X (The Hague, August 30 – September 2, 2016). There I am going to present some of my ideas under the topic ‘Spontaneous Affective Sharing.’
The account I will presenting draws on two conceptual tools from the broader phenomenological tradition: pre-reflective we-intentionality on the one hand and atmospheric perception on the other. My central claim, then, is that there are instances of affective we-consciousness which mainly emerge on the level of unthematic, pre-reflective orientation within one’s environment.
In the first part of the paper, I shall elucidate this claim as well as the appertaining account with the case of collective embarrassment. In the second part, I will critically review the claim about shared concerns as necessary conditions for affective sharing.
See you there!
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