Proponents of speculative realism have recently subjected phenomenology to severe criticism. It has been accused of being a form of Zombie philosophy, of never really having existed, of never having amounted to anything at all. The main thinkers of the (non-existing) tradition have been criticized for their inconsistencies, for never explaining what precisely they are doing, for failing to deliver what they always promised, but never provided: a wholehearted endorsement of metaphysical realism. By contrast, speculative realism has been praised as the only position able to yield real metaphysical realism.
In a recent paper, a version of which can be found here, I have taken a closer look at the phenomenology bashing found in the work of Sparrow, Harman, Meillassoux and others. My conclusion is that the criticism that speculative realism directs at phenomenology is flawed in various ways. It is too superficial, too simplistic, and it lacks novelty. The most interesting objections have already previously been voiced by other phenomenologists, by analytic philosophers, and by empirical scientists. As for its own positive contribution, I consider the realist credentials of speculative realism quite questionable, just as I find its metaphysical claims epistemologically underdetermined.
Since the paper was posted online, it has attracted quite some attention. Am I keen to invest more time in engaging with and reading the works of the speculative realists? The short (and long) answer is no.